Law Grad in Pink is a blog written by a law graduate in Adelaide for law graduates everywhere.

Showing posts with label public law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public law. Show all posts

Wednesday, 6 April 2016

ICAC v IBAC – the real differences between NSW and Victoria’s anti-corruption agencies

Introduction
New South Wales has the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Victoria has the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC). If you are an avid consumer of media you would have read that ICAC’s investigative powers are too broad and IBAC’s investigative powers are too limited. In Victoria in particular, IBAC’s powers have been a hot topic of early 2016, as the government introduced a Bill to amend the IBAC Act in early 2016.

The hype has led to comparisons with ICAC accompanied by some wildly inaccurate descriptions of ICAC’s powers. Don’t believe everything you read. In this blog post I go straight to the statute to explain the basic differences between ICAC and IBAC. Note that I only explain the basic differences, as a comprehensive comparison of the regimes would be a full time job. Feel free to share this post with any journalists you know to help keep information in the public domain correct.

Enabling statute
ICAC was established in 1988 by the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) (ICAC Act). IBAC was established in 2011 by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) (IBAC Act), replacing the Office of Police Integrity.

Objects
The objects clause of a statute plays an important role in interpretation, as an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred over a construction that does not promote that purpose or object (s.33 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) and s.35(a) Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)).

The principal objects of the ICAC Act are stated in s.2A as creating ICAC as an independent and accountable body:
“(i) to investigate, expose and prevent corruption involving or affecting public authorities and public officials, and
(ii) to educate public authorities, public officials and members of the public about corruption and its detrimental effects on public administration and on the community, and
(b) to confer on the Commission special powers to inquire into allegations of corruption.”

The objects of the IBAC Act are contained in s.8 and are to:
“(a)     provide for the identification, investigation and exposure of—
                (i)     serious corrupt conduct; and
                (ii)     police personnel misconduct;                         
(b)     assist in the prevention of—
                (i)     corrupt conduct; and
                (ii)     police personnel misconduct;
(c)     facilitate the education of the public sector and the community about the detrimental effects of corrupt conduct and police personnel misconduct on public administration and the community and the ways in which corrupt conduct and police personnel misconduct can be prevented;
(d)     assist in improving the capacity of the public sector to prevent corrupt conduct and police personnel misconduct;

(e)     provide for the IBAC to assess police personnel conduct.”

There are some immediately obvious differences in the objects of the two regimes:
·         the IBAC Act focuses on “serious corrupt conduct”, which is a narrower focus than that of the ICAC Act on “corrupt conduct”;
·         the IBAC Act specifically focuses on “police personnel misconduct” as well as and as a separate concept to “corrupt conduct”. This is because the regime incorporates the powers previously vested with the Victoria’s Office of Policy Integrity. The ICAC Act focuses on “corrupt conduct” and does not concern itself separately with “police personnel misconduct”, though police conduct that falls into the scope of “corrupt conduct” could be investigated by ICAC;
·         an object of the ICAC Act is to provide ICAC with powers to inquire into allegations of corrupt conduct. This is not an object of the IBAC Act.

Definition of “corrupt conduct”
The first limitation to note, present in both the ICAC Act and IBAC Act is that conduct will only be corrupt conduct if the conduct is sufficient to constitute a relevant offence. In the ICAC Act, the relevant offences are criminal offences, disciplinary offences, as well as conduct that could constitute reasonable grounds for terminating a public official, or could constitute a substantial breach of an applicable code of conduct by a Minister or Member of a House of Parliament. In the IBAC Act the relevant offences are more limited, being indictable offences against an Act, and three common law offences (only if committed in Victoria), being attempt to pervert the course of justice, bribery of a public official and perverting the course of justice. Already, the ICAC Act contains a broader definition of “corrupt conduct” merely by having a broader qualifying threshold of what will constitute a relevant offence.

After the conduct has met the relevant offence threshold, the conduct will be “corrupt conduct” if:

1.       In the ICAC Act (s.8), if it is:

·         Conduct which adversely or could adversely affect the honest or impartial exercise of official functions by any public official, group or body of public officials or any public authority (s.8(1)(a));
·         Conduct of a public official that constitutes or involves the dishonest or partial exercise of any of his or her official functions (s.8(1)(b));
·         Conduct of a public official or former public official that constitutes or involves a breach of public trust (s.8(1)(c));
·         Conduct of a public official or former public official involving the misuse of information or material that he or she has acquired in the course of his or her official functions, whether or not for his or her benefit or for the benefit of any other person (s.8(1)(d));
·         Conduct of any person which adversely or could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public official, any group or body of public officials or any public authority and which could involve any of the matters listed including official misconduct, bribery, blackmail, fraud, theft, and election bribery) (s.8(2)); and
·         Conduct that impairs, or that could impair, public confidence in public administration and which could involve one of a number of listed items including collusive tendering; defrauding the public revenue; and fraudulently obtaining or retaining employment or appointment as a public official (s.8(2A)).

2.       In the IBAC Act (s.4) , if it is:
·         Conduct of any person that adversely affects the honest performance by a public officer or public body of his or her or its functions as a public officer or public body (s.4(1)(a));
·         Conduct of a public officer or public body that constitutes or involves the dishonest performance of his or her or its functions as a public officer or public body (s.4(1)(b));
·         Conduct of a public officer or public body that constitutes or involves knowingly or recklessly breaching public trust (s.4(1)(c)); or
·         Conduct of a public officer or a public body that involves the misuse of information or material acquired in the course of the performance of his or her or its functions as a public officer or public body, whether or not for the benefit of the public officer or public body or any other person (s.4(1)(d)); or

·         Conduct that could constitute a conspiracy or an attempt to engage in any conduct referred to above.

In both the ICAC Act and the IBAC Act the definition of “corrupt conduct” includes conduct which occurs outside of Australia (s.8(5)) ICAC Act and s.4(2)(a) IBAC Act). The ICAC definition of “corrupt conduct” is broader in some respects, including by including conduct that “could adversely affect” as well as conduct that “adversely affects” (see for example s.8(1)(a) ICAC Act v s.4(1)(a) IBAC Act). Keep in mind these differences are exacerbated and when you consider IBAC can only investigate “serious corrupt conduct” (s.60(1)).

Pre-investigation powers
ICAC has the power under s.20A to conduct preliminary investigations. Examples of when ICAC might conduct a preliminary investigation include identifying conduct that might be made the subject of a more complete investigation. Section 20A was inserted into the ICAC Act in 1996 by the Police Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (NSW), which the Explanatory Memorandum explained “allows the Commission to make preliminary inquiries for the purpose of deciding whether to undertake an investigation”. Section 20A is worded “an investigation may be in the nature of a preliminary investigation”. This wording includes a “preliminary investigation” within the definition of an “investigation”, giving ICAC full investigative powers even when conducting a preliminary investigation. This includes powers to obtain information, documents, and enter public premises (s.21, 22, 23 ICAC Act). See also the definition of “corrupt conduct” in s.3, which provides the term includes “a preliminary investigation referred to in section 20A”.

IBAC is not prevented from conducting preliminary investigations, as conducting a preliminary investigation may be necessary for the performance of IBAC’s functions (s.16). However, for preliminary investigations, IBAC does not have the powers it does when conducting investigations, so essentially has no better powers than the average citizen in gathering information until the point in time in which IBAC decides to commence an investigation.

When can an investigation be initiated?
IBAC can commence an investigation once it is satisfied the conduct concerned may be “serious corrupt conduct” (s.60(2)). It can conduct an investigation on its own motion, or after receiving a complaint or notification about conduct (s.60(1)). Similarly, ICAC can commence an investigation on its own initiative, or after receiving a complaint, report or reference (s.20(1)) on satisfaction the conduct concerned may be “corrupt conduct”.

Investigative powers
When an investigation is on foot (under the ICAC Act this also includes preliminary investigations) ICAC’s investigative powers include the power to:
·         obtain information from public authorities and public officials by serving a notice in writing on a public authority or public official (s.21 ICAC Act);
·         obtain documents from any person by serving a notice in writing on that person (s.22); and
·         enter premises occupied or used by a public authority or public official, inspect documents or things in or on the premises and take copies of such documents (s.23).
In the course of an investigation ICAC can also conduct private “compulsory examinations” (s.30) or public inquiries (which are public but parts of which may be held in private) (s.31). ICAC has the power to summons any person to appear at a compulsory examination or a public inquiry (s.35).  IBAC has similar investigative powers to obtain information, obtain documents, enter premises and conduct examinations. Note that while ICAC’s examinations are generally held in public, IBAC’s examinations are to be held in private unless exceptional circumstances exist, it is in the public interest to hold a public examination and a public examination can be held without causing unreasonable damage to a person’s reputation, safety or wellbeing (s.117 IBAC Act). As a result, IBAC’s investigations tend to be much more discrete than ICAC’s investigations.

Apart from the difference in examinations being held in public or private, the anti-corruption agencies have similar and significant investigative powers. These powers exceed powers given to state or federal police. The main difference between the two anti-corruption agencies in regards to investigative powers is when these powers may be used. As discussed above, the definition of “investigation” in the ICAC Act includes preliminary investigations, meaning ICAC can use its investigative powers in much wider circumstances than IBAC. IBAC cannot use its investigative powers for preliminary investigations.

What about conduct that occurred before the commencement of the regime?
Both Acts apply to conduct that occurred before the commencement of the Act (s.8(3) ICAC Act and s.11 IBAC Act), though there are limitations on investigating this conduct. These limitations are more pronounced for the Victorian regime, which only commenced in 2011. The NSW regime commenced in 1988, meaning most conduct investigated will have occurred after the commencement of the regime, so any sections limiting the investigation of conduct occurring prior to 1988 will only come into play in the infrequent circumstance conduct occurring prior to 1988 is investigated.

The IBAC Act significantly limits the situations in which conduct which occurred entirely before 2012 (the year s.11 was inserted) can be investigated. Firstly, an investigation must not be conducted where the conduct is trivial, the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, the complaint lacks substance or credibility, or the conduct occurred at too remote a time to justify investigation (s.60(4) IBAC Act). This seems reasonable. However, section 60(5) provides a difficult test to satisfy before conduct occurring entirely before 2012 can be investigated. Such conduct can only be investigated where:
·         It is in the public interest to investigate the conduct;
·         In all the circumstances it is appropriate for IBAC to investigate the conduct; and
·         In the case where an investigatory body has already investigated or decided not to investigate the conduct, there is reliable, substantial and highly probative evidence that was not considered by the investigatory body or reliable, substantial and highly probative evidence that the investigation or decision not to investigate was materially affected by error.

Oversight and supervision
The Victorian Inspectorate is responsible for monitoring IBAC’s compliance with the IBAC Act. IBAC’s performance is monitored and reviewed by the IBAC Parliamentary Committee. This Committee is also responsible for receiving and reviewing IBAC’s investigation reports. The Public Interest Monitor supervises IBAC applications for surveillance device warrants and telecommunications interception warrants. Similarly, in NSW a Parliamentary Joint Committee monitors and reviews ICAC’s work as well as to review ICAC’s investigation reports and annual reports (s.64 ICAC Act).

So is IBAC really much less powerful than ICAC?
Contrary to what some writers might have you think, IBAC is not toothless. While its focus on investigating “serious corrupt conduct” is more limited than ICAC’s ability to investigate “corrupt conduct”, IBAC still has a wide ambit to conduct investigations and capture Victoria’s serious corrupt conduct. With ICAC having focused on what appears to be less serious instances of corrupt conduct in the past, much can be said about focusing resources on “serious corrupt conduct”.  While definitional limitations mean more minor instances of corrupt conduct may stay hidden in Victoria for now, IBAC still has the power to expose serious instances of corrupt conduct which should have a deterrent effect on all types of corrupt conduct. 

Much can be said about the comparatively discrete nature of IBAC’s examinations, which must occur in private unless the threshold test is met. This reputational threshold test does not exist for ICAC, which is a concern given ICAC can investigate all levels of allegedly corrupt conduct, where severe reputational damage is possible even where a claim or evidence has not yet been substantiated.

IBAC is held back somewhat by its preliminary investigative powers. Although it can undertake a preliminary investigation, it cannot use its investigative powers when conducting the preliminary investigation, limiting the information IBAC can obtain to be satisfied conduct may be “serious corrupt conduct” to commence an investigation. Several problems also arise from IBAC’s youth, and the fact conduct occurring prior to 2012 must meet the high threshold test in s.60(5) before it can be investigated.  



Did this blog post interest you? Interested in anti-corruption Commissions and the powers of investigative and enforcement agencies? Keep your eye out for my next blog post, a case summary of the High Court’s recent decision in R v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8.

Saturday, 7 November 2015

The removal of a judge by parliament – legislative supervision of the judiciary (aka “how to get rid of a judge”)

How can a judge be dismissed? What is the process and has it been done before? In light of the Commonwealth parliament commencing an investigation into Vice President Lawler of the Fair Work Commission, there has been renewed public interest in how a judge can be dismissed. Some of the reporting on the process has been inaccurate and misleading. This blog post summarises the statutory and common law requirements to remove a judge from office.

Four step process
While the exact procedure to dismiss a judge varies between jurisdictions and courts, the process can be distilled to four steps:

1.       Initiation of process is in the hands of the legislature itself – usually requires an inquiry by a former judge or judges
The legislature must initiate the process of dismissing a judge. Usually the first step is to instigate an inquiry into the judge’s conduct. The inquiry is initiated on motion by a House of Parliament. Inquiries are usually headed by a former judge or judges. Private individuals cannot move a court to compel the legislature to start a motion, as this interferes with the privileges of parliament. This principle was affirmed in Re Reid; Ex parte Bienstein (2001) 182 ALR 473 at 478-9 where a party in a family law matter sough to compel the President of the Senate, Margaret Reid to initiative an investigation and remove a judge of the Family Court of Australia.

NSW and the ACT are unique in that they have Judicial Commissions with functions that include examining and dealing with complaints about judges (Judicial Commissions Act 1994 (ACT) (ACT JC Act); Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) (NSW JO Act). In NSW the Judicial Commission is involved from the outset in complaint management and investigations, while in the ACT the Judicial Commission is only involved for the duration of the investigation once the Legislative Assembly has passed a resolution for the examination of a complaint (s.18 ACT JC Act).

In NSW, the Judicial Commission has a Conduct Division with the function of examining and dealing with complaints referred to it under Part 6 and with formal requests referred to it under Part 6A. A complaint can be made to the Judicial Commission by any individual, and Ministers can also refer complaints (ss.15 and 16). The Judicial Commission initiates the process by making a preliminary examination and deciding whether to refer the complaint to the Conduct Division (ss.20 and 21). The Conduct Division is made up of a panel of three, with two of the panel members being judicial officers and the third being a community representative (s.22). The Conduct Division must examine complaints referred to it and can initiate an investigation into a complaint (s.23).

The ACT Judicial Commission operates differently to the NSW Judicial Commission, the main difference being that the ACT Judicial Commission does not become involved until the Legislative Assembly passes a resolution for the examination of the complaint (s.18). In such a case, the executive must appoint a judicial commission to investigate the complaint, and the investigation and findings must be provided to the Attorney-General in the time period specified. Only parliament has the power to initiate an investigation, in a similar way to other jurisdictions that do not have a judicial commission. The ACT Judicial Commission is constituted by three current or retired judges (s.7) and has no direct community representative.

2.       Judge has a common law right (statutory in the ACT under s.15 of the ACT JC Act) to be heard in their own defence
The judge is usually given this opportunity to respond to or explain allegations made against them during the conduct of the investigation, if not before hand.

3.       There are only two grounds a judge can be removed for, misbehaviour and incapacity, either one or both must be proved depending on the relevant jurisdiction and court
Section 72(ii) of the Constitution states that a “Justice of the High Court and the other courts created by Parliament... shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity”. These two grounds of proved misbehaviour and incapacity in s.72 apply to High Court judges, Federal Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges, Family Court judges and judges of other courts created by Parliament under Chapter III of the Constitution. The grounds for removal in other jurisdictions are similar. In jurisdictions where no grounds for removal are stated, technically the legislature could remove a judge on any grounds, but no parliament in Australia has ever proceeded on this basis. It would be unprecedented for an Australian parliament to remove a judge on a bare address without grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity first being proved.

Legislation governing the grounds for removal in other jurisdictions includes:

1.       Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld) s.61(2) applies to the removal of Queensland Supreme Court and District Court judges – “proved misbehaviour justifying removal from office” or “proved incapacity to perform the duties of office”.
2.       Constitution Act 1889 (WA) s.55 does not specify grounds for removal, but s.54 uses the phrase “good behaviour” indicating a judge could be dismissed where “good behaviour” is not demonstrated.
3.       Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s.53(2) applies to the removal of a number of NSW judges including judges of the Supreme Court, District Court, and Land and Environment Court – “proved misbehaviour or incapacity”.
4.       Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s.75 applies to the removal of South Australian Supreme Court judges, does not specify grounds, but s.74 indicates grounds for dismissal could include where a judge has not demonstrated “good behaviour”.
5.       Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s.77(1) applies to the removal of judges of the Supreme Court and County Court, and Magistrates - “removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity”.
6.       Supreme Court Act 1978 (NT) s.40(1) applies to the removal of judges of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory - “removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity”.

The investigation tabled with parliament will make findings and recommendations as to whether misbehaviour or incapacity has been established.  Misbehaviour is a broad category that clearly includes serious criminal conduct but may also encompasses everything from severe conflicts of interest to corruption and bribery. Incapacity can be physical or mental. An example of what would constitute mental incapacity is the findings of the investigation conducted into Justice Vincent Bruce of the NSW Supreme Court in 1998. Numerous complaints had been made about Justice Bruce who was persistently late in writing judgments. The investigation found this behaviour was attributable to Justice Bruce suffering from severe depression. While the investigation found there was proved incapacity, NSW parliament did not proceed with the address and Justice Bruce resigned.

4.       Motion for removal must be passed by both Houses and forwarded to the Governor or Governor-General who then revokes the appointment of the judge.

Judges are rarely dismissed. In the 1800s only four Supreme Court judges were removed and in one of these cases the motion was invalidated by the Privy Council. The inquiries instigated in the 1900s include:
1.       The 1987 investigation instigated by Queensland parliament into the behaviour of Justice Angelo Vasta of the Queensland Supreme Court;
2.       The inquiry into the conduct of Justice Bruce of the NSW Supreme Court in 1998; and
3.       The inquiry commenced into the conduct of Justice Lionel Murphy of the High Court in 1981. Justice Murphy died before next steps could be taken.

It is very rare for a situation to arise where parliament would be required to pass the requisite motions to advise the Governor or Governor-General to revoke a judge’s appointment. Most judges choose to resign when the investigation is initiated or after the investigation has concluded rather than be dragged through an investigation and/or be dismissed by the Governor or Governor-General.

There is limited recourse outside this process
There is limited recourse outside for the behaviour of a judge outside the parliamentary process described above. The Chief Justice of a court can somewhat deal with performance issues through managing a judge’s work load. For example, by allocating the judge simple matters or reduce the number of matters the judge is hearing. However, even if a judge was allocated no matters, the judge would continue to be paid remuneration until dismissed by the Governor or Governor-General after a parliamentary motion has been successfully passed. While the system is not perfect, it does assist with maintaining judicial independence.    



Tuesday, 8 September 2015

The Senate Address and the Governor-General - What is a Senate Address? Does the Governor-General have the power to dismiss Royal Commissioner Dyson Heydon?


Labor Senators moved a motion called an “address” on 8 September 2015, asking the Governor-General Peter Cosgrove to dismiss Dyson Heydon from the Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption (TURC). While the motion was unsuccessful, it raises broader questions about the nature of a Senate Address and whether the Governor-General has the power to dismiss a Royal Commissioner.

Who can dismiss Dyson Heydon from TURC? 
To answer this question we must first examine who has the power to appoint a Royal Commissioner. Section 1A of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) gives the Governor-General the power to create Royal Commissions and appoint Commissioners to the Royal Commission by Letters Patent. It is important to note that s.1A of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) is prefaced by the words “without in any way prejudicing, limiting, or derogating from the power of the King, or of the Governor-General, to make or authorise any inquiry, or to issue any commission to make any inquiry”. Letters Patent are legal instruments in the form of a published written order issued by the Governor-General or the Queen. The Letters Patent outlines the terms of appointment, and usually a Commissioner end their tenure as a Commissioner when the Royal Commission concludes. One principle of responsible government is that the Governor-General will act on the advice of Government Ministers, unless the Governor-General is exercising a reserve power. While the Constitution creates a Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General (s.62 Commonwealth Constitution), it is the principle of responsible government that the Governor-General will act in accordance with the advice of Ministers. In practice, under s.1A of the Royal Commissions Act the Prime Minister will advise the Governor-General to create a Royal Commission and will advise the Governor-General which Commissioner(s) to appoint.  

Section 7 of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) provides that each Commissioner has the “same protection and immunity as a Justice of the High Court”. This means does not mean that a Commissioner can only be dismissed in the same way that a High Court judge can be dismissed. Essentially s.7 provides Royal Commissioners with immunity from civil claims. 

While the removal of Commissioners is not explicitly dealt with in the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) the removal can be made by the Governor-General on advice through Letters Patent. 

The question remains whether the Governor-General could act unilaterally to remove a Commissioner. This question is discussed below.

What is a Senate Address?
The Senate Address is a formal mechanism by which one branch of government (the legislature via the Senate) can express a view to the executive arm of government. It is simply a way for the Senate to express their views about a particular topic to the Governor-General or the Queen. Historically, most Senate Addresses to the King or Queen have been addresses of congratulations or sympathy. The Senate also produced addresses-in-reply in 1954, 1974 and 1977 when the Queen opened sessions of parliament in person. There have been several Senate Addresses to the Governor-General, with the Annotated Standing Orders of the Australian Senate listing the following addresses as being particularly important:
Ø  “1904 – requesting recognition of the constitutional fact that the provision of revenue and grant of supply is a joint act of both Houses;
Ø  1914 – two addresses, one requesting publication of the communications between the government and the Governor-General concerning the proposed simultaneous dissolution of both Houses under s.57 of the Constitution, and the second asking the Governor-General to submit to the electors six constitution alteration proposals passed by the Senate in accordance with s.128 of the Constitution but not passed by the House of Representatives;
Ø  1931 – urging that the Governor-General refuse to approve regulations in the current session that were the same in substance as regulations already disallowed by the Senate.”

The Senate Address in 1931 was particularly serious. The Scullin Labor Government had repeatedly introduced regulations that were struck down by the Senate. The Senate grew tired of the attempts and passed a motion addressing the Governor-General asking him to prohibit the government from making the regulations. The Governor-General did not take any action. The Governor-General’s power to exercise such a power is uncertain.

What is the significance of a Senate Address?
The Senate address has no legal effect. The Governor-General is not bound to follow the recommendation in the request. What the Governor-General does with this information is his own decision.

Does the Governor-General have the power to dismiss a Royal Commissioner?
As discussed above, the Governor-General’s express powers in the Constitution are exercised on Ministerial advice in line with the principles of responsible government. However, the Governor-General also has another set of powers which can be exercised unilaterally without advice, at the Governor-General’s own discretion or contrary to advice in certain circumstances. These powers are known as the reserve powers. The scope of the reserve powers is uncertain, as the reserve powers are a series of conventions developed from British conceptions of responsible government.

There are a few established reserve powers:
1.       The power to appoint a Prime Minister if an election results in a hung Parliament;
2.       The power to dismiss a Prime Minister in circumstances where the House of Representatives has passed a 'No Confidence' motion against the Prime Minister; and
3.       The power to refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives contrary to Ministerial advice. This is the most commonly used reserve power.

The following reserve powers are more doubtful, but arguably are held by the Governor-General:
1.       The power to refuse a double dissolution. A double dissolution has been requested six times by Parliament, and each time the Governor-General has dissolved parliament as requested. There is the possibility the Governor-General retains the power to refuse a double dissolution.
2.       The power to withhold assent to Bills that have passed both House of Parliament.
3.       The power to select a new Prime Minister where the outgoing Prime Minister resigns after a defeat in the House of Representatives. Some scholars argue the Governor-General is obliged to appoint the replacement proposed by the outgoing Prime Minister.
4.       The power to dismiss a Prime Minister where the Government cannot obtain supply and the Prime Minister refuses to resign or to call an election.

A power to unilaterally dismiss a Royal Commissioner on the basis of misconduct does not come in any of the above categories. This does not necessarily mean the reserve power to dismiss a Royal Commissioner does not exist, rather that it is uncertain.

Conclusion  
While a Labor-led Senate may be able to pass a Senate Address and formally indicate their view that Justice Heydon should be removed as Royal Commissioner, the Governor-General is unlikely to act on his own initiative to dismiss the Royal Commissioner, as the existence of such a reserve power is uncertain. The issues discussed raise broader points about the nature of reserve powers. Reserve powers are unable to be tethered by legislation and are widely believed to be unjusticiable. If concepts of responsible government were implied into the Constitution, as scholars such as Winterton have suggested in academic work, it is believed the reserve powers could become justiciable, potentially giving Governor-General’s more guidance and confidence to exercise their reserve powers.  






Monday, 1 June 2015

Cabinet confidentiality – can "leakers" be prosecuted

Cabinet has leaked again. Over the weekend the media were provided with a detailed account of confidential Cabinet discussions on whether the Minister for Immigration should be given the power to revoke the citizenship of suspected terrorists who have sole Australian citizenship. Regardless of your personal views on whether the Minister for Immigration should have this significant discretionary power and whether it is legal under international law to effectively make a person stateless, the information was obtained by the media from a Cabinet informant. This was a significant breach of Cabinet confidentiality. Cabinet confidentiality is an important principle of responsible government. If the “leaky” Cabinet member was discovered, is there any recourse available? Before I consider the question of whether the perpetrator can be punished, it is useful to quickly revise the basics of Cabinet confidentiality.

Who is in the Cabinet?
The Cabinet is not a Constitutional body, and is in fact not mentioned in the Constitution at all. The Constitution vests executive power in the Governor-General (s61) which includes the power to appoint Ministers. In practice, under the principles of responsible government, the Governor-General acts on the advice of the Prime Minister in making the Ministerial appointments. The Cabinet is made up of the Prime Minister plus senior Ministers appointed to Cabinet by the Prime Minister. The current Cabinet consists of:
1.       Prime Minister                                              Tony Abbott
2.       Deputy Prime Minister                                  Warren Truss
3.       Minister for Foreign Affairs                           Julie Bishop
4.       Minister for Employment                               Eric Abetz
5.       Attorney-General                                          George Brandis
6.       Treasurer                                                      Joe Hockey
7.       Minister for Agriculture                                 Barnaby Joyce
8.       Minister for Education                                   Christopher Pyne
9.       Minister for Indigenous Affairs                       Nigel Scullion
10.   Minister for Social Services                           Scott Morrison
11.   Minister for Communications                         Malcolm Turnbull
12.   Minister for Health and Sport                        Sussan Ley
13.   Minister for Small Business                           Bruce Billson
14.   Minister for Trade and Investment                 Andrew Robb
15.   Minister for Defence                                     Kevin Andrews
16.   Minister for Environment                              Greg Hunt
17.   Minister for Immigration                                Peter Dutton
18.   Minister for Finance                                      Mathias Cormann

The Cabinet Ministers are known as senior Ministers, and meet on a weekly basis. There are many other more junior Ministers who are not part of Cabinet.

The Federal Executive Council you have never heard of
While the Constitution doesn’t provide for the Cabinet, it does provide for a Federal Executive Council. Section 62 of the Constitution provides that “ there shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor‑General in the government of the Commonwealth, and the members of the Council shall be chosen and summoned by the Governor‑General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and shall hold office during his pleasure”. There are two important things to note about the Executive Council:
1.       The Executive Council and Cabinet are not the same. Cabinet is constituted by senior Ministers as the Prime Minister sees fit. In contrast, the Constitution dictates in section 64 that all Ministers “shall be members of the Federal Executive Council”.
2.       The Executive Council is treated as a mere formality. The real discussion and decision making happens in the Cabinet.

What is Cabinet confidentiality?
Cabinet confidentiality is a principle of responsible government that Cabinet discussions and papers will remain confidential. As the innermost workings of the executive are undertaken in Cabinet discussions, this confidentiality is meant to foster robust debate. All possibilities can be considered by Cabinet, as Ministers do not have to worry about the media reporting on a particular unpopular stance they took in Cabinet discussion. After engaging in robust debate, Cabinet can emerge with a unified decision to present to the public. A related concept is Cabinet collective responsibility, where all Cabinet members must publically support Cabinet decisions, even if they disagreed with the decision in Cabinet discussions or privately disagree with the decision. The collective responsibility extends to voting in parliament, where Ministers must vote in accordance with the Cabinet decision.

Is Cabinet confidentiality a common law concept?
No. It is a component of responsible government.

Is Cabinet confidentiality a statutory concept?
Cabinet confidentiality is a concept of responsible government, and is not found in statute. However, there are a number of statutory provisions that assist to reinforce the importance of and protect cabinet confidentiality, including freedom of information legislation which at both the Commonwealth and state levels provides that Cabinet documents are protected for 30 years from FOI requests.

Is Cabinet confidentiality in the Constitution?
Responsible government, of which Cabinet confidentiality is part, is one of the four great Constitutional principles of representative government, federalism, the separation of powers and responsible government. Responsible government is made up of a series of conventions. Responsible government is not enshrined explicitly in the Constitution.

High Court dicta suggest some conventions of responsible government have been implied into the Constitution. In particular:
1.       The convention that government is responsible to parliament can be inferred from sections 53, 57, 62 and 64;
2.       The convention that the Governor-General is to act only on advice is inferred from sections 62 and 64.

Cabinet confidentiality could not be said to have reached implied Constitutional status. Therefore, the status of Cabinet confidentiality remains that of a convention of responsible government.

What action can be taken against a Minister who breaches Cabinet confidentiality?
As discussed above, Cabinet confidentiality is not a common law, statutory or constitutional law concept. The essential problem with many conventions is that the boundaries are uncertain, and it is questionable whether a convention of responsible government is enforceable by courts. A court is likely to point to the separation of judicial and executive power and see a misuse of responsible government as an executive or political problem not appropriate for courts to consider. No judicial action can be taken against a leaky Cabinet Minister purely on the basis that the information was leaked and Cabinet confidentiality was breached.

Responsible government has conventions that deal with “leakers”
The principles of responsible government cover what should happen when Cabinet confidentiality is breached. If a Cabinet member breaches Cabinet confidentiality, convention is that they should immediately resign from their Cabinet and Ministerial position. Similarly, if a Minister is unable to publically support the Cabinet decision and wishes to openly object the decision, convention is that they must resign from Cabinet and their Ministerial position. The convention of resignation has existed in the Westminster System of responsible government for hundreds of years. Where a Minister fails to resign, the Prime Minister is supposed to step in and strip the “leaker” of their Ministerial portfolio.

In recent years, politicians do not appear to be taking the convention of resignation seriously. The “leaker” who fed the media information on Cabinet discussions of revoking the Australian citizenship of suspected terrorists should resign. If the Prime Minister discovers who leaked the information, the perpetrator should be stripped of their Ministerial portfolio. It is cowardly to anonymously feed the media. Responsible government provides Cabinet Ministers with two choices:
Choice 1: Engage in robust Cabinet debate. Maintain Cabinet confidentiality. Publically support Cabinet decisions.
Choice 2: Publically oppose Cabinet decision and resign.

Cabinet officials should not have a third choice of anonymously and cowardly feeding confidential Cabinet information to the media. The gradual erosion of Cabinet confidentiality should be taken seriously. Responsible government is a pinnacle of Australia’s Constitutional system. It looks like some Cabinet politicians need a refresher course.