Law Grad in Pink is a blog written by a law graduate in Adelaide for law graduates everywhere.

Showing posts with label corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corruption. Show all posts

Wednesday, 6 April 2016

ICAC v IBAC – the real differences between NSW and Victoria’s anti-corruption agencies

Introduction
New South Wales has the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Victoria has the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC). If you are an avid consumer of media you would have read that ICAC’s investigative powers are too broad and IBAC’s investigative powers are too limited. In Victoria in particular, IBAC’s powers have been a hot topic of early 2016, as the government introduced a Bill to amend the IBAC Act in early 2016.

The hype has led to comparisons with ICAC accompanied by some wildly inaccurate descriptions of ICAC’s powers. Don’t believe everything you read. In this blog post I go straight to the statute to explain the basic differences between ICAC and IBAC. Note that I only explain the basic differences, as a comprehensive comparison of the regimes would be a full time job. Feel free to share this post with any journalists you know to help keep information in the public domain correct.

Enabling statute
ICAC was established in 1988 by the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) (ICAC Act). IBAC was established in 2011 by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) (IBAC Act), replacing the Office of Police Integrity.

Objects
The objects clause of a statute plays an important role in interpretation, as an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred over a construction that does not promote that purpose or object (s.33 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) and s.35(a) Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)).

The principal objects of the ICAC Act are stated in s.2A as creating ICAC as an independent and accountable body:
“(i) to investigate, expose and prevent corruption involving or affecting public authorities and public officials, and
(ii) to educate public authorities, public officials and members of the public about corruption and its detrimental effects on public administration and on the community, and
(b) to confer on the Commission special powers to inquire into allegations of corruption.”

The objects of the IBAC Act are contained in s.8 and are to:
“(a)     provide for the identification, investigation and exposure of—
                (i)     serious corrupt conduct; and
                (ii)     police personnel misconduct;                         
(b)     assist in the prevention of—
                (i)     corrupt conduct; and
                (ii)     police personnel misconduct;
(c)     facilitate the education of the public sector and the community about the detrimental effects of corrupt conduct and police personnel misconduct on public administration and the community and the ways in which corrupt conduct and police personnel misconduct can be prevented;
(d)     assist in improving the capacity of the public sector to prevent corrupt conduct and police personnel misconduct;

(e)     provide for the IBAC to assess police personnel conduct.”

There are some immediately obvious differences in the objects of the two regimes:
·         the IBAC Act focuses on “serious corrupt conduct”, which is a narrower focus than that of the ICAC Act on “corrupt conduct”;
·         the IBAC Act specifically focuses on “police personnel misconduct” as well as and as a separate concept to “corrupt conduct”. This is because the regime incorporates the powers previously vested with the Victoria’s Office of Policy Integrity. The ICAC Act focuses on “corrupt conduct” and does not concern itself separately with “police personnel misconduct”, though police conduct that falls into the scope of “corrupt conduct” could be investigated by ICAC;
·         an object of the ICAC Act is to provide ICAC with powers to inquire into allegations of corrupt conduct. This is not an object of the IBAC Act.

Definition of “corrupt conduct”
The first limitation to note, present in both the ICAC Act and IBAC Act is that conduct will only be corrupt conduct if the conduct is sufficient to constitute a relevant offence. In the ICAC Act, the relevant offences are criminal offences, disciplinary offences, as well as conduct that could constitute reasonable grounds for terminating a public official, or could constitute a substantial breach of an applicable code of conduct by a Minister or Member of a House of Parliament. In the IBAC Act the relevant offences are more limited, being indictable offences against an Act, and three common law offences (only if committed in Victoria), being attempt to pervert the course of justice, bribery of a public official and perverting the course of justice. Already, the ICAC Act contains a broader definition of “corrupt conduct” merely by having a broader qualifying threshold of what will constitute a relevant offence.

After the conduct has met the relevant offence threshold, the conduct will be “corrupt conduct” if:

1.       In the ICAC Act (s.8), if it is:

·         Conduct which adversely or could adversely affect the honest or impartial exercise of official functions by any public official, group or body of public officials or any public authority (s.8(1)(a));
·         Conduct of a public official that constitutes or involves the dishonest or partial exercise of any of his or her official functions (s.8(1)(b));
·         Conduct of a public official or former public official that constitutes or involves a breach of public trust (s.8(1)(c));
·         Conduct of a public official or former public official involving the misuse of information or material that he or she has acquired in the course of his or her official functions, whether or not for his or her benefit or for the benefit of any other person (s.8(1)(d));
·         Conduct of any person which adversely or could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public official, any group or body of public officials or any public authority and which could involve any of the matters listed including official misconduct, bribery, blackmail, fraud, theft, and election bribery) (s.8(2)); and
·         Conduct that impairs, or that could impair, public confidence in public administration and which could involve one of a number of listed items including collusive tendering; defrauding the public revenue; and fraudulently obtaining or retaining employment or appointment as a public official (s.8(2A)).

2.       In the IBAC Act (s.4) , if it is:
·         Conduct of any person that adversely affects the honest performance by a public officer or public body of his or her or its functions as a public officer or public body (s.4(1)(a));
·         Conduct of a public officer or public body that constitutes or involves the dishonest performance of his or her or its functions as a public officer or public body (s.4(1)(b));
·         Conduct of a public officer or public body that constitutes or involves knowingly or recklessly breaching public trust (s.4(1)(c)); or
·         Conduct of a public officer or a public body that involves the misuse of information or material acquired in the course of the performance of his or her or its functions as a public officer or public body, whether or not for the benefit of the public officer or public body or any other person (s.4(1)(d)); or

·         Conduct that could constitute a conspiracy or an attempt to engage in any conduct referred to above.

In both the ICAC Act and the IBAC Act the definition of “corrupt conduct” includes conduct which occurs outside of Australia (s.8(5)) ICAC Act and s.4(2)(a) IBAC Act). The ICAC definition of “corrupt conduct” is broader in some respects, including by including conduct that “could adversely affect” as well as conduct that “adversely affects” (see for example s.8(1)(a) ICAC Act v s.4(1)(a) IBAC Act). Keep in mind these differences are exacerbated and when you consider IBAC can only investigate “serious corrupt conduct” (s.60(1)).

Pre-investigation powers
ICAC has the power under s.20A to conduct preliminary investigations. Examples of when ICAC might conduct a preliminary investigation include identifying conduct that might be made the subject of a more complete investigation. Section 20A was inserted into the ICAC Act in 1996 by the Police Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (NSW), which the Explanatory Memorandum explained “allows the Commission to make preliminary inquiries for the purpose of deciding whether to undertake an investigation”. Section 20A is worded “an investigation may be in the nature of a preliminary investigation”. This wording includes a “preliminary investigation” within the definition of an “investigation”, giving ICAC full investigative powers even when conducting a preliminary investigation. This includes powers to obtain information, documents, and enter public premises (s.21, 22, 23 ICAC Act). See also the definition of “corrupt conduct” in s.3, which provides the term includes “a preliminary investigation referred to in section 20A”.

IBAC is not prevented from conducting preliminary investigations, as conducting a preliminary investigation may be necessary for the performance of IBAC’s functions (s.16). However, for preliminary investigations, IBAC does not have the powers it does when conducting investigations, so essentially has no better powers than the average citizen in gathering information until the point in time in which IBAC decides to commence an investigation.

When can an investigation be initiated?
IBAC can commence an investigation once it is satisfied the conduct concerned may be “serious corrupt conduct” (s.60(2)). It can conduct an investigation on its own motion, or after receiving a complaint or notification about conduct (s.60(1)). Similarly, ICAC can commence an investigation on its own initiative, or after receiving a complaint, report or reference (s.20(1)) on satisfaction the conduct concerned may be “corrupt conduct”.

Investigative powers
When an investigation is on foot (under the ICAC Act this also includes preliminary investigations) ICAC’s investigative powers include the power to:
·         obtain information from public authorities and public officials by serving a notice in writing on a public authority or public official (s.21 ICAC Act);
·         obtain documents from any person by serving a notice in writing on that person (s.22); and
·         enter premises occupied or used by a public authority or public official, inspect documents or things in or on the premises and take copies of such documents (s.23).
In the course of an investigation ICAC can also conduct private “compulsory examinations” (s.30) or public inquiries (which are public but parts of which may be held in private) (s.31). ICAC has the power to summons any person to appear at a compulsory examination or a public inquiry (s.35).  IBAC has similar investigative powers to obtain information, obtain documents, enter premises and conduct examinations. Note that while ICAC’s examinations are generally held in public, IBAC’s examinations are to be held in private unless exceptional circumstances exist, it is in the public interest to hold a public examination and a public examination can be held without causing unreasonable damage to a person’s reputation, safety or wellbeing (s.117 IBAC Act). As a result, IBAC’s investigations tend to be much more discrete than ICAC’s investigations.

Apart from the difference in examinations being held in public or private, the anti-corruption agencies have similar and significant investigative powers. These powers exceed powers given to state or federal police. The main difference between the two anti-corruption agencies in regards to investigative powers is when these powers may be used. As discussed above, the definition of “investigation” in the ICAC Act includes preliminary investigations, meaning ICAC can use its investigative powers in much wider circumstances than IBAC. IBAC cannot use its investigative powers for preliminary investigations.

What about conduct that occurred before the commencement of the regime?
Both Acts apply to conduct that occurred before the commencement of the Act (s.8(3) ICAC Act and s.11 IBAC Act), though there are limitations on investigating this conduct. These limitations are more pronounced for the Victorian regime, which only commenced in 2011. The NSW regime commenced in 1988, meaning most conduct investigated will have occurred after the commencement of the regime, so any sections limiting the investigation of conduct occurring prior to 1988 will only come into play in the infrequent circumstance conduct occurring prior to 1988 is investigated.

The IBAC Act significantly limits the situations in which conduct which occurred entirely before 2012 (the year s.11 was inserted) can be investigated. Firstly, an investigation must not be conducted where the conduct is trivial, the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, the complaint lacks substance or credibility, or the conduct occurred at too remote a time to justify investigation (s.60(4) IBAC Act). This seems reasonable. However, section 60(5) provides a difficult test to satisfy before conduct occurring entirely before 2012 can be investigated. Such conduct can only be investigated where:
·         It is in the public interest to investigate the conduct;
·         In all the circumstances it is appropriate for IBAC to investigate the conduct; and
·         In the case where an investigatory body has already investigated or decided not to investigate the conduct, there is reliable, substantial and highly probative evidence that was not considered by the investigatory body or reliable, substantial and highly probative evidence that the investigation or decision not to investigate was materially affected by error.

Oversight and supervision
The Victorian Inspectorate is responsible for monitoring IBAC’s compliance with the IBAC Act. IBAC’s performance is monitored and reviewed by the IBAC Parliamentary Committee. This Committee is also responsible for receiving and reviewing IBAC’s investigation reports. The Public Interest Monitor supervises IBAC applications for surveillance device warrants and telecommunications interception warrants. Similarly, in NSW a Parliamentary Joint Committee monitors and reviews ICAC’s work as well as to review ICAC’s investigation reports and annual reports (s.64 ICAC Act).

So is IBAC really much less powerful than ICAC?
Contrary to what some writers might have you think, IBAC is not toothless. While its focus on investigating “serious corrupt conduct” is more limited than ICAC’s ability to investigate “corrupt conduct”, IBAC still has a wide ambit to conduct investigations and capture Victoria’s serious corrupt conduct. With ICAC having focused on what appears to be less serious instances of corrupt conduct in the past, much can be said about focusing resources on “serious corrupt conduct”.  While definitional limitations mean more minor instances of corrupt conduct may stay hidden in Victoria for now, IBAC still has the power to expose serious instances of corrupt conduct which should have a deterrent effect on all types of corrupt conduct. 

Much can be said about the comparatively discrete nature of IBAC’s examinations, which must occur in private unless the threshold test is met. This reputational threshold test does not exist for ICAC, which is a concern given ICAC can investigate all levels of allegedly corrupt conduct, where severe reputational damage is possible even where a claim or evidence has not yet been substantiated.

IBAC is held back somewhat by its preliminary investigative powers. Although it can undertake a preliminary investigation, it cannot use its investigative powers when conducting the preliminary investigation, limiting the information IBAC can obtain to be satisfied conduct may be “serious corrupt conduct” to commence an investigation. Several problems also arise from IBAC’s youth, and the fact conduct occurring prior to 2012 must meet the high threshold test in s.60(5) before it can be investigated.  



Did this blog post interest you? Interested in anti-corruption Commissions and the powers of investigative and enforcement agencies? Keep your eye out for my next blog post, a case summary of the High Court’s recent decision in R v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8.

Thursday, 16 April 2015

ICAC v CUNNEEN [2015] HCA 14 – GOING BEYOND THE POLITICS

Introduction
The recent High Court case of the Independent Commission Against Corruption v Margaret Cunneen & Ors [2015] HCA 14 has been heavily criticised by journalists, politicians and some members of the legal profession for taking an alleged “narrow” approach to “corrupt conduct” and reigning in ICAC’s powers. These critics claim that the court should have taken a broad approach to interpretation as this would have produced a more useful political outcome. In this article I argue that the High Court’s legal reasoning is correct. Instead of starting from a desired political outcome, I analyse the High Court’s reasoning using the principles of statutory interpretation. While I found one of Gageler J’s reasons in the dissent compelling, I found the majority’s reasoning could still stand on other pillars of reasoning.

Background to the case
ICAC began an investigation into Margaret Cunneen, Deputy Crown Prosecutor of NSW. The alleged conduct was that Cunneen gave her son’s girlfriend certain legal advice when she had a car accident to avoid having a breath test. The alleged advice was that her son’s girlfriend should pretend having chest pains. Cunneen commenced action on two main grounds:
1.       That the allegations did not constitute “corrupt conduct” and the investigation was therefore beyond ICAC’s powers; and
2.       That ICAC provide reasons for its decision to commence an investigation.

Cunneen was unsuccessful before the primary judge on both points. ICAC is not required to disclose reasons for its decision to commence an investigation as section 111 of the ICAC Act entitled “secrecy” provides that ICAC is not required to produce documents or divulge information in court. Cunneen appealed on both point (1) and point (2).

In Cuneen v ICAC [2014] NSWCA 421 the Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Basten JA, and Ward JA) affirmed the primary judge’s reasoning for ICAC not having to provide reasons for its decision to commence an investigation. However, Cunneen was successful before the New South Wales Court of Appeal on point (1). While the reasons between judges differed, the Court of Appeal held that the investigation was beyond ICAC’s powers because the alleged conduct was not “corrupt conduct”. ICAC applied for leave to appeal to the High Court.

Key sections of the ICAC Act
One of the functions of ICAC is to investigate corrupt conduct (s13 ICAC Act). “Corrupt conduct” is defined in sections 7 to 11 in Part 3 of the ICAC Act. In particular, section 8 describes the general nature of corrupt conduct. Section 8(1) and section 8(2) are the focus of the case. Section 8 establishes five main categories of “corrupt conduct”:

1.       Conduct adversely affecting directly or indirectly the honest or impartial exercise of official functions (s8(1));
2.       Dishonest exercise of official functions (s8(1));
3.       Breach of public trust (s8(1));
4.        Misuse of information acquired in the course of official functions (s8(1)); and
5.       Conduct that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect directly or indirectly the exercise of official functions by any public official, such conduct including perverting the course of justice (s8(2)).

For ICAC to be successful in the High Court, it would have to successfully argue that Cunneen’s alleged conduct fitted in one of these categories of “corrupt conduct”. ICAC argued for what I have labelled as Category 5 (italicised above). The interpretive question the High Court faced was specifically concerned with the meaning of s8(2), in particular the interpretation of the phrase “adversely affect”.

Section 2A of the ICAC Act is also important, as it states the principal objects of the ICAC Act and is referred to by the High Court in the course of interpreting section 8. I have pasted section 2A in full:

The principal objects of this Act are:
(a) to promote the integrity and accountability of public administration by constituting an Independent Commission Against Corruption as an independent and accountable body:
(i) to investigate, expose and prevent corruption involving or affecting public authorities and public officials, and
(ii) to educate public authorities, public officials and members of the public about corruption and its detrimental effects on public administration and on the community, and
(b) to confer on the Commission special powers to inquire into allegations of corruption.

What was the legal question before the High Court?
The majority phrased the question as:

“what is meant by the expression "adversely affects, or that could adversely affect ... the exercise of official functions by any public official" in the definition of "corrupt conduct" in s 8(2)” ([1]).

Gageler J also focuses on this question in his dissent, but framed the question more broadly, as “whether ICAC has power to investigate an allegation of criminal conduct having the potential to impede or impair the exercise of an official function by a public official in a manner involving no wrongdoing on the part of that public official” ([73]).

More specifically, the High Court was choosing between two possible alternative meanings of “adversely affect” in s8(2):

1.       Narrower meaning: Adversely affect or could adversely affect the probity of the exercise of an official function by a public official;
2.       Broader meaning: Adversely affect or could adversely affect the efficacy of the exercise of an official function by a public official in the sense that the official could exercise the function in a different manner or make a different decision from that which would otherwise be the case ([2]).

What was the High Court’s answer?
The High Court ruled 4-1 that ICAC had no power to investigate those affairs as the alleged behaviour did not fall into the definition of “corrupt conduct”, specifically the definition in s8(2). The majority (French CJ, Hayne J, Kiefel J and Nettle J) delivered a joint judgment. Gageler J dissented.

The majority found that the narrower meaning was the correct interpretation. This resulted in the alleged conduct not being within the ambit of “corrupt conduct” and ICAC having no power to investigate the matter. In his dissent, Gageler J argued for the broader meaning of “adversely affect”.

Did the majority’s reasoning correctly follow the principle of statutory interpretation?
The modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation was clarified in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355. Project Blue Sky requires the text being interpreted to be considered in light of its context and purpose. Section 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) requires that a construction promoting the purpose or object of the Act to be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.  I go through the majority’s reasoning under the headings “Text”, “Context” and “Purpose” to show how sound the majority’s reasoning is. I also incorporate the dissenting judgment into my comments.

Text
The Project Bluesky approach requires interpretative analysis to start with the text to identify the plain and ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning rarely ends up being the legal meaning, but it serves as a starting point for analysis.

The majority do cover this initial step, but do not identify an ordinary meaning. Instead they say “adversely affects” is a “protean expression capable of a number of meanings according to the context in which it appears” ([56] and [60]). They assert the meaning should be “adversely affect” as understood by public administration in the context of corruption (see discussion below). This is in contrast to Gageler J’s dissent and ICAC’s submissions that “adversely affect” has an ordinary meaning, being the broader meaning described above. Even if this is so, the Project Bluesky approach does not allow one to stop there. The ordinary meaning is merely the starting point and must be considered in context and in light of the statutory purpose.

Where Gageler J in his dissent really departs from the majority is the authority he relies on to support his interpretation. His argument is essentially that the plain and ordinary meaning of “adversely affects” is the broader meaning and that this should not be departed from unless there is a clear reason to do so (contrast with the modern Project Bluesky approach requires context and purpose to be considered in all cases). Gageler J relies on the case of PMT Partners Pty Ltd (In liq) v Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service [1995] HCA 36 where it is stated “it is "of fundamental importance" that the language of the definition is accorded its "natural and ordinary meaning unless some other course is clearly required", and that "limitations and qualifications are not read into" the definition unless "clearly required by its terms or its context". We don’t need to go into the dissent too much, but I would just like to make two points:
1.       PMT Partners was decided in 1995, before 1998 when Project Bluesky clarified the modern purposive approach to interpretation that context and purpose must always be considered;
2.       Even the PMT Partners approach appears to allow for context and purpose to be taken into account. Something that Gageler J does not appear to do in his dissent. While Gageler J does analyse the context of section 8, he does not link it back to the ordinary meaning of the text and does not contemplate the influence of this context on changing the ordinary meaning ([81] – [82]).

Context
This requires the text being interpreted to be read in the context of the rest of the Act. The Act is concerned with the integrity of public administration. This context informs the meaning of “adversely affects”. As the majority point out, the narrower meaning is consistent with the ordinary understanding of corruption in public administration, while the broader meaning is inconsistent with this understanding, as it would enable ICAC to exercise its “extraordinary coercive powers” well beyond the ordinary understanding of corruption and public administration ([3]). Public law principles also come into play here, where the judiciary generally take a more limited approach when dealing with coercive powers limiting the rights of individuals.

Considering the text in context with the rest of the Act can involve reconciling provisions within the Act. The majority cite the Project Bluesky approach to reconiliation:

"The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined 'by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole'.”
In particular, they emphasise achieving a result that maintains the unity of all the statutory provisions ([31]).

This approach becomes important when the majority start analysing the words “adversely affect” with the rest of section 8, particularly s8(1). To reconcile the subsections, s8(2) becomes a two pronged test, as it takes on some of the characteristics of s8(1) (see [45] onwards). Conduct will be “corrupt conduct” for the purposes of s8(2) where:
1.       The conduct in question “could involve” any of the matters in 8(2) (a)-(y); and
2.       The conduct adversely affects or could adversely affect the probity of the exercise of an official function in one of the ways listed in s 8(1)(b)-(d).

The High Court argue that this construction, and the more narrow use of the words “adversely affect” is favourable, as it is consonant with the language in s2A and s9 and embraces offences which could affect the integrity of public administration and excludes those which could not.

Context can sometimes involve consideration of extrinsic material. Section 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) permits extrinsic material to be used in interpretation for two uses:
1.       To confirm the meaning is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text; and
2.       To determine the meaning of the provision where the provision is ambiguous or obscure OR if the ordinary meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 

There is a war of words between the majority and the dissent on extrinsic material. The majority use the Explanatory Note to argue that ICAC was not intended to operate as a general crime commission and therefore the narrow interpretation is correct ([54] and [67]). Gageler goes into much more detail in the legislative history and convincingly argues that the majority is mislead in its reliance on this. While I believe Gageler J is correct here, the use of extrinsic material is not a major pillar of the majority’s reasoning, and the rest of the majority’s reasoning is still sound.

Purpose 
The ICAC Act has an “objects section” in section 2A (pasted above). The Objects section can be used to identify the purpose of the Act, but if this purpose conflicts with a more specific purpose identified elsewhere in the statute, this more specific purpose is to prevail (Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643 at 645). The ICAC Act is relatively small, and no conflicting purposes are identified. The High Court can therefore rely on the legislative purpose as stated in the objects section.

The majority point out that the narrower meaning of “adversely affect” is consistent with the objects in s2A and that the broader meaning is inconsistent with these objects ([3]). The Act is directed to investigate, expose and prevent corruption affecting public authorities. It is therefore not likely it was intended to reach to a broad array of crimes having nothing to do with corruption in public administration apart from a direct/indirect effect conceivably had on the efficaciousness of public officials ([53]).

Conclusion
I hope I have demonstrated that the High Court majority had no choice. Once they had applied the principles of statutory interpretation, the legal meaning of “adversely affect” was clearly the narrower meaning. While to some commentators this may have lead to an unsatisfactory result politically, with ICAC’s powers potentially limited, this is not a concern of the High Court. In the traditional view of the separation of powers, if the public have an issue with legislation as it stands, such as the ICAC Act, they need to lobby the parliament for change through the usual processes. It is not the High Court’s role to be concerned with political outcomes.

There has been a lot of fear mongering that parliament could never get its act together to increase the investigative powers of ICAC by expanding the definition of corrupt conduct. I am not convinced by these arguments. Who do you think made the ICAC Act in the first place? While the political mood of parliament may change, there is no reason why the legislature, which managed to pass an Act establishing ICAC could not amend the Act.