In the case of ICAC v Cuneen [2014] HCA 14 the High
Court examined the powers of the Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC), causing intense media and legal scrutiny of the powers of ICAC and
other anti-corruption agencies. In 2016 the High Court has turned its focus to ICAC’s
Victorian equivalent, the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission
(IBAC). In R v IBAC [2016] HCA 8 (R v
IBAC), the High Court examined the question of whether IBAC could summon two
police officers who had allegedly committed assault and who may be charged with
the offence to give evidence before IBAC about the same matters. The decision
is important in that it reaffirms the principles of the privilege against self-incrimination,
is an example of how statute can abrogate common law rights, and indicates how
other anti-corruption agencies with similar statutory regimes (such as ICAC)
should approach such situations.
Before reading this blog post I
recommend you read my blog post detailing the main differences between ICAC and
IBAC.
Facts
Victoria Police commenced
“Operations Ross” on 20 March 2015 to investigate alleged incidents at Ballarat
police station which may have involved human rights violations in respect of
women. One particular incident to be investigated was whether police officers
assaulted a woman in a cell on 15 January 2015. IBAC decided to investigate the
matter using its powers to investigate serious police personnel misconduct and
issued summons to the police officers on 1 April 2015 to give evidence in public
examination of their knowledge of matters in Operations Ross. The police
officers were suspended from duty on 2 April 2015 on the basis they were
reasonably believed to have committed the offence, but were not charged at that
point in time. The police sought to challenge the power of IBAC to publicly
examine persons on the same matter for which they are likely to be charged with
an offence.
Two legal questions
before the High Court
1.
Does the “Companion Rule” extend to situations
where a person has not yet been charged with an offence?
2.
Does s.144 of the IBAC Act apply to persons not
yet charged with an offence?
Road to the High
Court
On 10 April 2015 the police wrote
to the IBAC Commissioner and submitted that they could not be compelled to give
evidence. The IBAC Commissioner rejected the submissions on 15 April 2015. On
16 April the police commenced judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court
of Victoria seeking orders preventing IBAC from examining the police officers.
Justice Riordan rejected the argument holding that as the appellants had not
yet been charged with an offence the process of criminal justice had not
commenced and the entitlement to protection from self-incrimination was not yet
operative. The police were also unsuccessful before the Court of Appeal, where
their Honours held the IBAC Act “intended that the persons, who might be
examined, include persons who might have been implicated in that conduct”.
High Court decision
The High Court unanimously
dismissed the appeal and held:
1. The
“Companion Rule” does not extend to situations where a person has not yet been
charge with an offence; and
2. Section
144 of the IBAC Act applies to all persons issued with a witness summons, including
persons not yet charged with a criminal offence.
French CJ, Kiefel J, Bell J, Keane
J, Nettle J, and Gaudron J gave reasons in a joint judgment and Gageler J wrote
separate reasons.
High Court’s legal
analysis
1. The “companion rule”
The fundamental principle of the
common law in criminal proceedings is that the prosecution must prove the guilt
of the accused person. The companion rule is derived from this fundamental
principle and was enunciated by the High Court in Lee v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 455:
“The companion
rule to the fundamental principle is that an accused cannot be required to
testify. The prosecution cannot compel a person charged with a crime to assist
in the discharge of its onus of proof.”
The authorities make it clear
that the operation of the companion rule is dependent on the judicial process
having been engaged by a person being charged with but not yet tried for a
criminal offence. In R v IBAC, the appellants asserted as one of their
submissions that the police under investigation could not be summoned to give
evidence before IBAC as it would breach the companion rule. The High Court held
in the present case the companion rule is not engaged as the appellants have
not been charged and no prosecution is pending ([48]). The High Court refused
to extend the operation of the companion rule to situations where a person had
not yet been charged for the following reasons:
1. The
rationale behind the authorities for the companion rule is to protect the
forensic balance between prosecution and accused in the judicial process as it
has evolved at common law – this rationale does not extend to persons who have
not yet been charged ([48]).
2. Extending
the companion rule in this instance would be contrary to the objects of the
IBAC Act which include identifying, investigating and exposing police personnel
misconduct (s.8 IBAC Act), and applying the companion rule in anticipation of
commencement of criminal proceedings would frustrate the ability of IBAC to
carry out this object ([51]).
3. The
appellants failed to clearly enunciate the extent to which the companion rule
should be extended, varying their submissions from “persons reasonably believed
to have committed a criminal offence” to “a person the specific subject of an
investigation” to “a person reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal
offence” ([49]).
4. If
the companion rule was extended to protect persons reasonably suspected of
having committed a criminal offence, there is uncertainty as to who is to hold
the suspicion, especially where different persons having access to different
bodies of information may have different views on the issue ([50]).
Gageler J gave similar reasons to
the joint judgment, concluding that the extension of the companion rule in this
situation frustrates a clear object of the legislation which is “the
identification, investigation and exposure of serious corrupt conduct and
police personnel misconduct” ([74]) and ([77]).
His Honour also noted a number of
issues not considered in the joint judgment did not consider. First Gageler J
noted the importance of considering Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Victoria’s
Charter), and in particular how the
companion rule interacts with s.25(2)(k) which contains the right of a person
charged with a criminal offence “not to be compelled to testify against himself
or herself to confess guilt”. His Honour did not answer the question as it had
not been explored in argument. Second, Gageler J noted that no attention had
been given to the detailed statement of compatibility provided to Victorian
Parliament when the IBAC Bill was debated. The statement of compatibility
usefully explained that the abrogation of an individual’s right against
self-incrimination was justified in this instance “to assist the IBAC in its
functions as a truth-seeking body that is able to undertake full and proper
investigations”. Neither the appellants nor respondents considered the
statement of compatibility in argument.
2.
Self-incrimination
and section 144 of the IBAC Act
Ordinarily a person is entitled
to claim the privilege against self-incrimination where a person’s answer is
likely to incriminate them. This privilege is based on the fundamental
principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused and that an
accused has the right to remain silent. The High Court referred to Sorby v The Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR
281 where Gibbs CJ referred to R v Boyles
(1861) 1 B&S 311 in enunciating when the privilege against
self-incrimination is enlivened:
“to entitle a
party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the Court must see, from
the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the person
is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the
witness from his being compelled to answer”.
The common law privilege can be
curtailed by statute. In R v IBAC, the High Court held that the IBAC Act
clearly intended to abrogate the common law privilege against
self-incrimination, as the broad purpose of Pt 6 of the IBAC Act is to obtain
material not presently available to advance the objective of maintaining public
confidence in the police force ([55]), and such information would likely
include information that may be self-incriminating. Further, s.144 clearly
abrogates the privilege.
Section 144 provides that a
witness is not excused from answering a question, giving information or
producing a document when summoned on the ground the answer, information or
document might tend to incriminate the person (s.144(1)). However, while this
information must be given by a witness summoned by IBAC, the self-incriminating
information cannot be used against the witness in judicial proceedings (subject
to a few limitations) (s.144(2)).
The appellants argued that s.144
does not apply to persons yet to be charged with a criminal offence. The High
Court rejected this argument, as the section read with the evident purpose of
the IBAC Act points to an intention that s.144 applied to all witnesses
summoned including witnesses who have not yet been charged with an offence, as
objective of maintaining public confidence in the police force may include
obtaining information that is self-incriminating.
Gageler J gave similar reasons to
the joint judgment noting:
·
The IBAC Act clearly manifests the intention
that a person summoned and examined might be a person whose criminal police
personnel misconduct is the subject matter of the investigation; and
·
The use of the word “a person” in s.144 clearly
contemplates any witness summoned cannot be excused from providing information
on the grounds of self-incrimination.
Implications and
lessons to learn
The case reaffirmed that the
companion principle only applies to persons charged with a criminal offence. It
is also a useful example of how the common law privilege against
self-incrimination can be abrogated by statute. ICAC’s statute contains a
similar provision to s.144 of the IBAC Act which abrogates the common law
privilege against self-incrimination but provides this information can only be
used for the purposes of the investigation concerned (s.26 ICAC Act), so R v
IBAC indicates how the High Court would decide a similar case in the NSW
jurisdiction.
In R v IBAC the High Court also reaffirmed
IBAC’s clear powers to summon any person for
examination. ICAC’s statute contains similar provisions, so the decision may
have some value in reaffirming ICAC’s powers to summon any person for examination.
Importantly for those practising
working with Victorian statute, Gageler J’s reasons provide useful reminders to
ensure you consider Victoria’s Charter and statement of compatability in your
submissions and argument, as it may be helpful for interpretation purposes, and
some judges find these arguments particularly persuasive.