The conduct in question:
Commissioner Heydon accepted an invitation to
speak at the Sir Garfield Barwick address hosted by the Liberal Party. Commissioner
Heydon withdrew his acceptance on 13 August.
The rule against bias
The rule against bias is based on the principle
that “decision-making must be and be seen to be impartial”. In the case of
Commissioner Heydon we are concerned with the “be seen to be impartial”
component of the rule, being apprehended bias. Justice must not only be done
but be seen to be done (Ebner at [6]).
The test for apprehended bias comes from Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; Clenae Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2000] HCA 63:
Apprehended
bias will exist where a “fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend
that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the
question the judge is required to decide” [6].
Whether apprehended bias is present in any given case is very fact dependent, as an observer will have different expectations of the impartiality required by a decision maker in different circumstances. Commissioner Heydon is presiding over a Royal Commission. Most of the cases involve executive decision making or judicial decision making. However, despite factual differences, the principles in these cases apply to Commissioner Heydon’s situation.
Applying the test for apprehended bias – principles from case law
1. The test for apprehended bias uses the word “might”. Anyone who has followed Justice Heydon’s career would realise he is a black letter lawyer and would not let the incident affect his decision making. However, this is irrelevant. The test requires no prediction as to how the decision maker will actually approach the matter. The consideration is “one of possibility (real and not remote). Not of probability” (Ebner [7]).
a.
Identify what it is that might lead a judge to
decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and
b.
Identify the connection between the matter and
the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits [Ebner [7]).
a.
Disqualification by interest – “cases where
some direct or indirect interest in the proceedings, whether pecuniary or
otherwise, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of prejudice, partiality or
prejudgment”;
b.
Disqualification by conduct – “cases in which
conduct, either in the course of, or outside, the proceedings, gives rise to
such an apprehension of bias”;
c.
Disqualification by association – “cases where
the apprehension of prejudgment or other bias results from some direct or
indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons
interested in, or otherwise involved in, the proceedings”; and
d.
Disqualification by erroneous information – “cases
where knowledge of some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance gives
rise to the apprehension of bias”.
These
categories overlap somewhat, particularly category 1 and 3, and category 3 and
4. Commissioner Heydon’s conduct in accepting an invitation to present at a
Liberal Party event could come into the “disqualification by conduct” category.
4. There is a difference between decision making as a Minister and judicial decision making, with the standards of detachment applicable to a Judge not applying to Ministers (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507). Commissioner Heydon is acting in his capacity as a Commissioner in the Royal Commission, not a Judge. While there is no case law on the application of the rule of bias to Royal Commissions, it is likely that a Commissioner will be held to similar standards of impartiality as a Judge.
5. The “fair-minded lay observer”:
a.
Does not know
the personality or character of the Judge. The fact a Judge has been a Judge
for over 20 years and has consistently stuck to the black letter of the law is
irrelevant (Honda Australia Motorcycle v Johnstone [2005]
VSC 387).
b.
Has a broad
knowledge of the facts and circumstances of both the proceedings and the events
leading to the claim of apprehended bias (Honda Australia Motorcycle
v Johnstone [2005] VSC 387).
Is the test satisfied?
While the finding of apprehended bias should
not be made lightly, I believe the test for apprehended bias has been satisfied
and that Commissioner Heydon should dismiss himself. The bare assertion that a judge has an
"interest" in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of
no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection
with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is
articulated (Ebner, [8]). Counsel for
the ACTU, Robert Newlinds QC, in his submissions, has elevated the claim of
apprehended bias beyond a mere assertion. He identified the conduct and linked
the conduct with the feared deviation. While some of the ACTU’s submissions are
not at all relevant, such as that the Commissioner should excuse himself
otherwise findings of the Commission will lack credibility, the ACTU appears to
have satisfied the evidentiary burden required.
The “fair-minded lay observer” on seeing Commissioner Heydon accept an invitation to present at a Liberal Party function might reasonably believe that the Commissioner would not bring an impartial mind to the Royal Commission proceedings. The Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption is inherently political. The alignment of trade unions with the Labor Party and the support the Liberal Party has publically given the Royal Commission is no secret. Such public alignment with the Liberal Party could cause the “fair-minded lay observer” to form the view the Commissioner would not bring an impartial mind to the Royal Commission. Again, the test is concerned with whether the “fair-minded” lay observer “might” form this view. The fact that Commissioner Heydon is a well-respected Judge who managed to be impartial throughout his judicial career is irrelevant. In fact, it is Commissioner Heydon’s respect for the law that will probably see Commissioner Heydon dismiss himself on the basis of apprehended bias tomorrow.